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ABSTRACT 
Insurers that show losses are expected to sell tax-free securities and replace them with taxable 
securities since they can no longer benefit from tax savings. However, rebalancing these 
portfolios after the financial crisis would entail recognizing additional losses during a time 
period when their financial performance was under stress and their industry was under increased 
scrutiny. I examine portfolio rebalancing behavior using the period after the financial crisis as a 
proxy for increased regulatory scrutiny. I predict and find that insurers with losses subsequent to 
the financial crisis were less likely to increase their ratio of taxable/nontaxable securities. 
Insurers may also face increased regulatory scrutiny due to their own actions which I measure as 
whether an insurer is in regulatory violation. I further find that insurers that are in regulatory 
violation (using IRIS ratios) during the financial crisis are less likely to increase their ratio of 
taxable/nontaxable securities.  
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PREFACE 
The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of regulation, in particular, increased regulatory 
scrutiny, on investment choice. Specifically, I examine whether property and casualty (P&C) 
insurers are less likely to rebalance their portfolios of investment securities subsequent to the 
financial crisis. 
I am thankful to my dissertation committee, Joseph Comprix (chair), Randy Elder (co-chair), 
Susan Albring, William Horrace, and Craig Nichols for their guidance and encouragement. All 
errors are my own.  
Data Source: National Association of Insurance Commission (NAIC), by permission. The NAIC 
does not endorse any analysis or conclusions based upon the use of its data.           
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1. Introduction 
 
“Insurance regulation has traditionally focused strongly on product regulation, supervising the 
terms and prices of individual policies. More recently, the focus has shifted towards a 
comprehensive regulation of solvency. As a consequence of the recent financial crisis, solvency 
regulation of financial institutions for insurers is set to tighten further (Baltensperger, 2011).” 
The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of regulation, in particular, increased 
regulatory scrutiny, on investment choice. Specifically, I examine whether property and casualty 
(P&C) insurers are less likely to rebalance their portfolios of investment securities subsequent to 
the financial crisis. Consistent with efficient tax strategy, I find that insurers rebalance their tax-
free securities towards taxable securities in the year subsequent to reporting a loss. This incentive 
declines when insurers are under regulatory scrutiny, either brought upon themselves when they 
are in regulatory violation (measured by their Insurance Regulatory Information Systems (IRIS) 
ratios
1
), or increased scrutiny outside of their control as was the case after the financial crisis. I 
estimate that an insurer with a loss in the prior year will rebalance their tax-free securities 
towards taxable securities in the current year by 9.9 percent; however, this rebalancing strategy 
declines to 1.3 percent when the insurer is in regulatory violation after the financial crisis. For 
example, assuming an insurer had a loss of $1 from the prior year; I estimate that an insurer will 
rebalance $0.086 cents away from taxable securities when they are under heavy regulatory 
scrutiny and after the financial crisis.             
 The financial strategy of P&C insurers under normal circumstances is to invest in long-
term assets, which include fixed income securities (both taxable and nontaxable), and real- estate 
holdings (Lambert and Hofflander, 1967). The recent financial crisis has caused losses for many 
                                                          
1Please see Appendix A for explanation and definition of IRIS ratios. 
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P&C insurers (Towers Perrin, 2008). Due to the ability to carry losses forward, finance theory 
would suggest that P&C insurers should shift from tax-free securities to taxable securities when 
facing losses because of the lower yield on tax-free securities.
2
 For example, Smith (1989) 
suggests that insurers with underwriting losses could realign their portfolios by liquidating their 
tax-exempt securities and purchasing taxable securities. This allows insurers to earn higher 
yields on their investment portfolio as losses are deductible from taxable investment income, 
thereby making the after tax return on taxable investments greater than the return earned on tax-
free investments. Though this strategy yields higher portfolio returns, P&C insurers may be less 
willing to rebalance from tax-free securities to taxable securities because they do not want to 
recognize potentially large investment losses on their financial statements subsequent to the 
financial crisis
3
 since this is a period of increased regulatory scrutiny.   
 Historically, insurers have been the largest market for tax-free securities. Insurers’ 
demand for tax-free securities is directly influenced by their insurance profits and losses. As 
losses increase, insurers’ demand for taxable instruments increases since losses can be deducted 
from future investment income. This creates an increase in the after-tax yield on taxable 
investments. On the other hand, as losses decrease, insurers’ demand for taxable instruments 
decreases and their demand for tax-exempt securities increases since the after tax yield of taxable 
securities with similar risk characteristics become equivalent to yields from tax-exempt securities 
(Kopcke and Randall, 1991). Like other financial intermediaries, insurers have experienced 
decreasing profitability because of the financial crisis. However, insurers have been reluctant to 
recognize investing losses in addition to operating losses.  
                                                          
2
This incentive is not specific to only the P&C industry. All firms should rebalance to take advantage of future tax savings. What 
makes this setting unique is the ability to observe the types of holdings within the portfolio and the regulatory environment. 
3Warren Buffet stated that “…insurers will not sell securities at price levels that would recognize the major losses, for any 
number of reasons, including public reaction, institutional pride or protection of stated net worth (Gurufocus.com).” 
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Insurance companies are regulated by the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC) and state insurance regulators.
 
As a result, the financial reporting of 
insurance companies is different than other types of firms. For example, insurance companies 
use Statutory Accounting Principles (SAP), instead of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP). SAP has different objectives than GAAP as
 
SAP is designed to satisfy the different 
needs of the insurance industry. The primary users of the statutory financial statements are state 
or local regulators. In addition, SAP is focused on the long-term liabilities of insurance 
companies and stresses the long-term claim-paying ability of the insurer. SAP results in lower 
capital and income volatility than GAAP. This type of financial reporting gives a more 
conservative measure of an insurer’s financial stability.  
The primary objective of insurance regulators and the NAIC is to minimize market 
failures that would otherwise cause insurers to incur an excessive risk of insolvency or engage in 
market abuses that hurt consumers. State insurance regulatory resources are employed to monitor 
market activities, compliance, and solvency (NAIC, 1995). Given the more conservative 
reporting under SAP and its use by regulators, insurers face unique pressure to maintain solvency 
compared to other financial intermediaries. This focus on solvency combined with increased 
scrutiny from insurance regulators after the financial crisis may lead insurers to make inefficient 
investment decisions. A 2009 article indicates that “….given the financial crisis and recession, 
regulators have to show activity and demonstrate they’re on top of things (Gusman, 2009).”   
This study examines one aspect of the investing decisions of P&C insurers, portfolio 
rebalancing. Specifically, I examine rebalancing from tax-free securities towards taxable 
securities after a loss occurs. This is the first study to examine investment decisions in a 
regulated industry after the financial crisis. This study highlights the importance of asset 
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maintenance for property and casualty insurance companies. For example, an insurer should 
rebalance their investment portfolio (i.e., shift tax-free securities to taxable securities) if losses 
persist into the future. Moreover, the financial crisis provides an exogenous setting to test 
rebalancing under increased regulatory scrutiny.  
I examine the following research questions. First, do insurers rebalance their portfolios 
away from tax-exempt securities when reporting losses as is suggested in finance theory [see 
Liebowtiz (1981); Poterba (1986)], even during a financial crisis? My findings support prior 
theory and conclude that insurers make tax efficient investing decisions by rebalancing their 
portfolio towards taxable securities when losses occur. My second research question is whether 
regulatory scrutiny exogenous to insurers’ behavior changes the relationship between tax 
incentives (losses) and investment decisions (portfolio rebalancing). I find that insurers continue 
rebalancing subsequent to the financial crisis, but that the amount of rebalancing is mitigated. 
This shows that increased regulatory scrutiny diminishes the relationship between tax incentives 
(losses) and efficient tax investing (portfolio rebalancing.) Lastly, I examine whether insurers 
with losses are even less likely to rebalance when they are in regulatory violation, which may 
signal to regulators that insurers have financial solvency problems.    
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews prior 
literature in the property and casualty industry that helps to illustrate the importance for insurers 
to rebalance toward taxable investments when losses occur. In section three, hypotheses are 
introduced and developed, while section four discusses the research design. Section five 
describes the sample selection process, defines the variables, and provides descriptive statistics 
and correlations. Section six reports the results and section seven reports sensitivity analyses. 
Section eight concludes and discusses the limitations. 
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2. Literature Review  
This study discusses two streams of research: 1) research on rebalancing insurance 
companies’ portfolios toward taxable investments; and 2) research on insurers and their 
regulatory environments.  
2.1 Rebalancing toward taxable investments 
 Property and casualty insurers derive their income from two sources: underwriting and 
investing. Income from underwriting can be volatile and is historically generates negative 
income (Fairley, 1979). However, the major component of insurers’ income is from investments, 
whether unrealized or realized losses/gains. Subsequent to the financial crisis, in my sample the 
average underwriting losses were $3,082,730. Thus, investment decisions in taxable and tax-free 
securities in this industry are paramount since insurers use their investment income to cover 
underwriting losses. P&C insurers generally invest in a mix of taxable and tax-free securities 
[see Lambert and Hofflander (1966); Lambert and Hofflander (1967)]. For example, Lambert 
and Hofflander (1966) describe the conflict between policyholders and shareholders of P&C 
insurers as a conflict between two goals: liquidity (for unexpected losses) and higher investment 
income (which may decrease liquidity.)  
 As a result, as insurers’ income declines (or becomes a loss) insurers are inclined to sell 
their tax-free investments since they may not benefit from the tax savings and since the 
investments have a lower yield. With the ability to carry losses forward, insurers would gain a 
larger benefit from the higher yields from taxable investments in future periods. However, the 
rebalancing of a P&C insurer’s portfolio of investments can send a negative signal to the capital 
markets since the insurer’s investment strategies are called into question by investors (Oakland, 
1973.) Prior literature describes why P&C insurers rebalance their tax-free securities to taxable 
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securities and vice versa [see Liebowitz (1981); Poterba (1986); Smith (1989); PonAnul and 
Viswanath (1995); Bradford and Logue (1998); Harrington and Niehaus (2003)]. 
  An earlier study by Liebowitz (1981) showed that tax-free yield curves have a steeper 
slope than taxable yield curves, which indicate that P&C insurers invest in tax-free securities 
when taxable securities are too costly. Poterba (1986) discusses alternative theories that explain 
the tax-free/taxable yield spread and concludes that the market for tax-free securities is 
segmented, and provides evidence that the spreads between long-term taxable and tax-free 
securities respond to changes in expected future tax rates. Smith (1989) offers empirical evidence 
suggesting that tax-free/taxable yield ratios affect P&C insurers’ returns, even when taxable 
interest rates are taken into account. PonAnul and Viswanath (1995) and Harrington and Niehaus 
(2003) show that when firms’ tax-free securities increase, the yield differential between taxable 
and tax-free securities decreases, which results in an increase in net income after taxes. Bradford 
and Logue (1998) provide empirical evidence that P&C insurers are able to take advantage of 
underwriting losses by increasing holdings of taxable securities. Their study suggests that P&C 
insurers can rebalance their tax-free and taxable holding positions to obtain a higher yield.  
Further, the  earnings manipulation literature suggests P&C insurers’ managers can 
manage tax savings and/or meet regulatory capital (solvency) requirements through loss reserve 
and asset-liability management [see Gaver and Paterson (1999); Ke, Petroni, and Shackelford 
(2000); Petroni, Ryan, and Whalen (2000); Nissim (2010)]. However, other studies have 
challenged why P&C insurers rebalance toward taxable investments. Derrig and Ostaszewski 
(1997) argue that the effective tax rate plays a role in determining combined investment and 
underwriting losses. By investigating insurers’ use of the effective tax rate on investment 
income, several studies call into question prior literature that does not factor additional 
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parameters into theoretical models  of underwriting losses [see Doherty and Garven (1986); 
Cummins (1990); Taylor (1994)], a method which other prior studies have used. Since tax-free 
securities usually have a lower pre-tax return than taxable securities, the effect of the mix of 
taxable investments and tax-free investments on a P&C insurer’s overall tax liability becomes an 
important consideration in making investment decisions.
4
         
2.2 Insurance and Regulatory Environment 
 Regulation is a primary component of insurers underwriting and investment activities. 
Prior studies focus on solvency regulation and regulation efficiency (NAIC, 1995). There are 
different monitoring mechanisms to detect insolvency among insurers. First, Insurance 
Regulatory Information Systems (IRIS) ratios assist regulators to fully assess the financial 
condition of an insurer.
5
 IRIS ratios serve as an initial financial snapshot for state regulators to 
help detect which insurers need further in-depth analysis.
6
 IRIS ratios are used to help regulators 
target resources on more risky insurers. I calculate the twelve IRIS ratios each year between 
2007 through 2011 and compare these ratios to the acceptable ranges set by the  
National Association of Insurance Commission for each ratio. If insurers’ fall outside of the 
usual ranges (i.e., four or more ratio violations), then the insurers require regulatory attention.
7,8
 
The IRIS ratios are valuable in identifying companies that are likely to experience financial 
                                                          
4Interest income on tax-free securities may not always be completely tax-free for P&C insurers. However, the line item for tax-
free securities is listed as entirely tax-free.   
5 NAIC (2001) states,” One of the most difficult tasks facing insurance regulators is to make effective use of limited resources. 
All companies are required to file annual statements with all states in which they are licensed to operate. Obviously, no state is 
able to review thoroughly the financial condition of all licensed companies immediately upon receipt of the annual statements. 
IRIS helps to select those companies that merit highest priority in the allocation of the regulators' resources, thus directing those 
resources to the best possible use.”   
6Nissim (2010, 32) states…”The IRIS ratios are only a preliminary screen for targeting troubled insurers, and regulators 
exercise judgment concerning the appropriate response to IRIS failure.”   
7There are three possible levels of attention regulators have for review if insurers are outside of the usual range: Level A: high 
priority for review (e.g., Total score of 4 or more indicates Level A); Level B: may require review, but not immediate (e.g., Total 
score of 2 or 3 indicates Level B); and Reviewed, no level (e.g., Total score of 1 or 0 indicates Reviewed).       
8The criteria for determining usual range values and the usefulness of the IRIS ratios, although based on the recent experience of 
companies becoming financially insolvent, may not be valid for future experience in different economic periods. For this reason, 
the components of the ratios are reviewed annually and updated as necessary.   
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difficulties. However, it is worth cautioning the reader that there are other ratios and trends used 
by regulators to measure adverse financial conditions by an insurer.  
 For example, Financial Analysis and Solvency Tracking (FAST) scores and Risk Based 
Capital (RBC) ratios have been implemented since the early 1990s to help identify insurers 
heading toward financial uncertainties and to help identify insurers that may be undercapitalized. 
The FAST scores direct attention to large, nationally recognized insurers, while IRIS ratios 
evaluate both large and small insurers. The RBC ratio is the theoretical amount of capital surplus 
needed to absorb the risks involved in the operation of business for insurers. The major areas of 
risk facing a P&C insurer include asset risk, underwriting and reserving risk, and credit risk. 
However, IRIS ratios are still the most commonly used method in prior literature [see Petroni 
(1992); Beaver, McNichols, and Nelson (2003); Gaver and Patterson (2004); Gaver and 
Patterson (2007)]; therefore IRIS ratios are used in this study. 
However, other studies have adopted both the FAST scores and RBC ratios. For example, 
using the FAST scores and the RBC ratios, Cummins, Grace, and Phillips (1999) test a large 
sample of P&C insurers to predict insolvencies over a three-year time horizon. The authors find 
that FAST scores are better than RBC ratios in predicting insurers’ insolvency. Grace, 
Harrington, and Klein (1998) examine the probability of correctly identifying weak insurers 
using FAST scores and RBC ratios. Their findings show that the FAST system dominates RBC 
ratios in identifying financially weak P&C insurers. Finally, from an international perspective, 
Cummins and Phillips (2009) compare the United States (US) RBC system with the European 
Union Solvency II system, and the Swiss Solvency Test. The limitations the authors find for the 
US are related to operational and catastrophe risks and qualitative measures such as corporate 
governance.                 
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 P&C insurers that serve policyholders in the US are regulated at the state level. Each state 
has enacted statutes and an extensive list of regulatory requirements that are designed to protect 
policyholders (Nissim, 2010).
9
 Grace (1990) hypothesizes that overestimating reserves offers an 
opportunity for insurers to shelter profits. Nelson (2000) hypothesizes that insurers conducting 
business in a stringent rate regulatory environment will under-reserve in order to persuade 
regulators they can charge a lower price than the regulated rate. Kwon, Kim, and Lee (2005) find 
that regulators tend to stress their responsibilities to protect policyholders’ interests and be 
thoroughly involved with the exit strategy of the distressed insurer. In a recent article, Harrington 
(2009) studied the role of American International Group (AIG), the insurance sector in the 2007–
2009 financial crisis, and the implications for insurance regulation. He discusses which insurers 
carry systemic risk and whether a systemic risk regulator is desirable for insurers or other 
nonbank financial institutions. Grace and Leverty (2012) provide empirical evidence that 
insurers do not manipulate reserves to avoid solvency monitoring. I extend prior literature by 
hypothesizing that insurers do not rebalance their portfolio securities when a loss occurs in the 
prior year and they are in regulatory violation.  
  
                                                          
9
The NAIC codified SAP in the Accounting Practices and Procedures Manual. State insurance laws and regulations require 
insurance companies domiciled in the United States to comply with the guidance provided, except as prescribed or permitted by 
state law. SAP generally reflects a liquidating (i.e., ability to pay claims) rather than a going concern basis of accounting. For 
example, SAP requires that deferred policy acquisition costs be expensed immediately instead of matched against the premiums 
as they are earned and recognized in income.  Accordingly, performance measures calculated using SAP numbers typically 
appear less favorable than those prepared using GAAP numbers.   
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3. Hypotheses 
 Prior theory predicts that P&C insurers will use losses to shelter taxable investment 
income and invest the balance of their portfolio in taxable securities.
10
 I hypothesize that P&C 
insurers with a prior year loss are more likely to rebalance towards taxable investments in the 
current year. There are several reasons why P&C insurers report losses. For example, the insurer 
could have had poor underwriting condition cycles or the insurer investment portfolio could have 
been devalued. Therefore, whether a P&C insurer with losses would decide to shift their tax-free 
investments to taxable investments is an important issue in the insurance industry since P&C 
insurers are wary of regulatory intervention and solvency issues. For example, if an insurer 
suffers losses due to underwriting, these losses present a tax incentive to the insurers by giving 
the insurer the ability to carry forward these losses to offset future taxable income. Thus insurers 
have the opportunity to earn higher investment returns through rebalancing to taxable securities 
that have a higher pre-tax rate of return versus tax-exempt securities of the same level of risk 
since the higher returns will be shielded by the loss carry forward.  
If an insurer suffers losses due to investment, the same tax incentive still applies 
however, some of the investments that would be sold in the rebalancing may be the same 
investments that are in a loss position and thus the insurer faces the dilemma of realizing an 
investment loss today in order to gain future tax benefits. I do not disentangle whether losses are 
from investment or underwriting because they are most likely due to both. Therefore insurers 
face opposing incentives: the tax incentive versus the regulatory solvency incentive.  
To illustrate this scenario (P&C insurers with a loss in the prior year are more likely to 
rebalance toward taxable investments in the current year), for example, Pacific Specialty P&C 
                                                          
10
Cummins and Philips (1994) develop a model of profit maximization incorporating the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986 
provisions applicable to P&C insurers.   
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Co. had a loss in the year 2007 and their taxable security investments divided by the sum of 
taxable security and non-taxable security investments was 53.67 percent in 2007. In 2008 the 
insurer increased their taxable securities by 14.91 percent to 68.58 percent. Therefore, based on 
prior theory, I propose that insurers will be more likely to increase their taxable investment 
exposure when losses occur in the prior year.   
 Thus, I test the following hypothesis, stated in alternative form: 
H1:  P&C insurers with a loss in the prior year are more likely to rebalance toward taxable 
investments in the current year. 
 
 The first hypothesis focuses on P&C insurers that suffered a loss at the start of the 
financial crisis. I check all insurers that had a loss in 2006 through 2010. Based on prior theories, 
I propose that P&C insurers will be less likely to rebalance their taxable securities following a 
prior year loss to take advantage of tax benefits in the current year subsequent to the financial 
crisis. This is because losses after the crisis are more salient to insurance regulators due to 
increased scrutiny. Thus if an insurer incurs losses from rebalancing in addition to losses already 
incurred, there is an increased chance that insurers will face action on the part of regulators since 
their capital requirements may be at risk. For example, Sheffield Insurance Co. had a loss in the 
year 2009 and their taxable security investments divided by the sum of taxable security and non-
taxable security investments was 18.74 percent in 2009. In 2010 this insurer decreased their 
taxable securities by 10.40 percent to 8.34 percent.  
-Insert Figure 1 here- 
 The second hypothesis, stated in the alternative form, is: 
H2:  P&C insurers with a prior year loss are less likely to rebalance towards taxable 
investments after the financial crisis. 
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 Rebalancing also becomes less likely when insurers’ IRIS ratios are in regulatory 
violation or when P&C insurers could potentially be reviewed by regulators. This type of 
regulatory scrutiny is self-inflicted by insurers. There is no existing evidence that shows P&C 
insurers who are in regulatory violation according to the NAIC and have losses from the prior 
year will rebalance towards taxable securities in the current year. There are prior studies of 
insurers managing different accounts to avoid regulatory review when they are in regulatory 
violation, but in this case insurers have tax incentives (from losses) to rebalance even though 
rebalancing may not help them mask their condition to regulators. Thus there is a conflict 
between possible future tax savings and current avoidance of regulatory violation. Therefore, I 
test for evidence that P&C insurers in regulatory violation will rebalance towards taxable 
securities when the insurer has a loss from the prior year.  
To illustrate the scenario that P&C insurers with a prior year loss and with two or three 
unusual IRIS ratios are less likely to rebalance toward taxable investments, I use the following 
example. Countryway Insurance Co. had a loss in 2009 and their taxable security investments 
divided by the sum of taxable security and non-taxable security investments was 89.98 percent in 
2009. In 2010 this insurer decreased their taxable securities by 16.11 percent to 73.87 percent. 
To illustrate my final scenario that P&C insurers with a prior year loss, with four or more 
unusual IRIS ratios are even less likely to rebalance towards taxable investments, I use the 
following example. Lighthouse Property Ins. Corp. had a loss in the year 2010 and their taxable 
security investments divided by the sum of taxable security and non-taxable security investments 
was 73.62 percent in 2010. In 2011 this insurer decreased their taxable securities by 19.90 
percent to 53.72 percent. 
-Insert Figure 2, 3, & 4 here- 
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 The third hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is: 
H3a: P&C insurers, with two or three unusual IRIS ratios are less likely to rebalance toward 
taxable investments when a loss occurs in the prior year. 
H3b: P&C insurers, with four or more unusual IRIS ratios are even less likely to rebalance 
towards taxable investments when a loss occurs in the prior year. 
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4. Research Design 
 To address the hypotheses stated above, I estimate the following regression model: 
                   
                                                                     
                                                                    
                                                                      
                   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
where,  
  = For all insurers in the property and casualty industry; 
  = For years 2007 to 2011; 
                 = Earned taxable investment income deflated by the sum of 
earned taxable investment income plus earned tax-free 
investment; 
          = Dichotomous variable with a value of one if the P&C insurer 
suffered a loss from the prior year, zero otherwise; 
 
            = Dichotomous variable with a value of one if the year is 2009, 
2010, or 2011, zero otherwise; 
 
            = Dichotomous variable with a value of one if the P&C insurer 
has four or more unusual IRIS ratios, respectively, zero 
otherwise [see Petroni, 1992; Gaver and Paterson, 2007];
11,12
 
 
            = Dichotomous variable with a value of one if the P&C insurer 
has two or three unusual IRIS ratios, respectively, zero 
otherwise; 
 
          = Logarithm of net admitted assets; 
 
                                                          
11Petroni, 1992; Gaver and Patterson, 2007 explains the weak IRIS A variable in there Appendix A  
12 IRIS ratios are computed using statutory financial data. Unusual ratios are those that exceed certain bounds specified by the 
NAIC. Gaver and Paterson (2007) show that managers intentionally understate reserves to avoid IRIS ratio violation.  
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               = Direct premium written deflated by the net admitted assets; and 
 
             = Net underwriting gains (losses) deflated by the net admitted 
assets. 
 
The two effects of the interaction between              and                may not be 
merely additive. For example, the effect of being an insurer that has negative net income from 
the prior year and after the financial crisis could be greater than the sum of their individual 
contribution. The interaction between             , and              , and 
               captures that since losses affect insurers’ capital requirements, an insurer may 
be reluctant to recognize losses.  
 I control for insurer size using net admitted assets (Beaver and McNichols, 1998). Net 
admitted assets generally include assets that are liquid and whose value can be assessed, or 
receivables that can reasonably be expected to be paid. Net admitted assets are a critical 
component for computing capital adequacy to state insurance regulators; they have a much 
narrower definition than might be applied under GAAP. Certain assets may be accounted for in 
an insurance company's balance sheet but only net admitted assets are allowed to be counted for 
purposes of calculating statutory capital or compliance with solvency ratios.
13
 I expect a negative 
relationship between the size of the insurer and the insurer’s decision to rebalance their portfolio 
toward taxable securities. Direct premiums written are commonly used in the P&C insurance 
industry as a measure of business growth (Adiel, 1996). Therefore, understanding the 
components of written premiums is necessary to correctly evaluate growth.
14
  
 Net underwriting gains (losses) are the remains after paying claims and expenses. 
Insurers generate profits from underwriting and investment income. Prior research has shown 
                                                          
13Net admitted assets exclude any valuation allowance. Examples of non-net admitted assets include electronic data processing 
equipment and software as well as furniture and equipment.  
14Absent this understanding, a user of written premium information may misinterpret the true growth rate of an insurer, especially 
during periods of rapid change such as in processing systems or a transition to a different type of business.   
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that the greater the amount of underwriting risk an insurer assumes, the less risk it can assume in 
its taxable and tax-free securities. The amount of underwriting risk is believed to be one of the 
determining factors in this relationship, as the principle purpose of the insurer is to provide 
insurance coverage for their policyholders (Lambert and Hofflander, 1966.)       
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5. Data 
5.1 Sample Selection 
 Statutory accounting data was collected from the NAIC 
 
files for years 2007-2011. For all 
hypotheses, insurers must be incorporated inside the United States, and have sufficient data to 
calculate all the relevant variables (1,245 observations are excluded). My final sample consists of 
13,030 insurer-year observations.  
-Insert Table 1 here- 
5.2 Variable Definitions 
 My hypotheses require tests of three key variables. For each P&C insurer, I calculate the 
                    ratio
15
; earned taxable investment income divided by the sum of 
earned tax-free investment income plus earned taxable investment income.            
16
 is 
the after tax net income from the statutory insurers’ filings. This variable is used to calculate 
             which indicates if the insurers suffered negative prior year net income. Finally, 
              is used to help regulators target their resources on riskier insurers. This variable 
is used to calculate the               and               variables which indicate if the 
P&C insurer has four (two) or more (three) unusual IRIS ratios, respectively.
17,18
       
-Insert Table 2 here- 
  
                                                          
15NAIC – Statutory: Exhibit of Net Investment Income and Exhibit of Capital Gains (Losses) Page.   
16NAIC – Statutory: Statement of Income Page.   
17NAIC – Statutory: Liabilities, Surplus, and Other Funds, Statement of Income, Underwriting and Investment Exhibit, Cash 
Flow, and Exhibit of Net Investment Income Page.   
18Please refer to Appendix A for guidelines of insurers falling outside usual ranges.   
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5.3 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation 
 Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the 13,030 insurer-year observations. All 
financial statement variables used in the regressions are calculated using the Belsley-Kuh-
Welsch (BKW) test that is based on several measures of influence. The BKW test uses four 
criteria to identify a data point as an influential outlier (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, 1980.)
 19
 The 
mean for taxable securities and non-taxable securities are 17,778 (in 000’s) and 5,687 (in 000’s) 
which is approximately a 3:1 ratio. The mean for net income is 14,026 (in 000’s). The net 
income for the sample is positive, on average. However, P&C insurers that endured losses could 
be impacted more by their non-taxable securities because they do not benefit from tax savings.        
From an initial glance at the IRIS ratios, the mean and median suggest that a small 
amount of P&C insurers are in regulatory violation.
20
 My results are consistent with Table 4 of 
Grace and Leverty (2012). However, for P&C insurers that are in regulatory violation, 
subsequent analysis demonstrates this is meaningful when a P&C insurer decides whether to 
rebalance its investments toward taxable securities.  
-Insert Table 3 here- 
 Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of variables used in the analysis. The dependent 
variable                     indicates that, on average, P&C insurers hold 79.6 percent 
of their investments in taxable securities. Roughly 20 percent of P&C insurers incur losses. From 
2007 to 2008 losses the percentage of P&C insurers with losses increased by 15.01 percent (See 
Figure 1). The independent variables               and               are 9.5 percent 
and 36.7 percent, respectively. As I indicated earlier, there are two levels of scrutiny (A and B) 
                                                          
19In addition, I winsorized (at the 1% and 99% percentiles) all the variables used in the regressions and obtained similar results.   
20On average, 11% of US companies have 4 or more ratios that fall outside the usual range (NAIC, 2001).    
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that a regulator uses in their initial screening assessment. First, Level A indicates the P&C 
insurer is a high priority review, meaning a more thorough financial examination will be 
conducted. Second, Level B indicates the P&C insurer may require a review, but an immediate 
review is not necessary.  
-Insert Table 4 here- 
 A correlation table is presented in Table 5.  The correlation between          
           and              is positive and significant which is consistent with P&C 
insurers with a prior year loss are more likely to rebalance toward taxable investments. The 
correlation between                     and               and               
are positive and significant, which indicates that P&C insurers that are in regulatory violation are 
more likely to rebalance toward taxable investments. However, I am more interested in the 
interactions between              ,               and              and an insurer’s 
                    ratio. For the two variables              and             , 
there is a significant perfectly negative correlation between the two variables -0.9816, as 
expected. Hence, I observe the losses and gains separately because of the different interactions 
with the IRIS ratios.    
-Insert Table 5 here- 
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6. Results 
 Table 6 presents the results from estimating equation (1). For each regression model (1-4) 
the coefficient     ,  the effect of a loss, is positive and significant, implying that insurers 
with a loss in the prior year are more likely to rebalance toward taxable investments. Therefore, 
the null hypothesis stated in H1 is rejected. The economic intuition is that insurers reporting 
losses should sell tax-free securities and replace them with taxable securities since they can no 
longer benefit from any tax savings.  
To test H2, I observe the coefficient      for regression models 3 and 4, which rejects 
the null hypothesis stated in H2. Despite the fact that, the coefficient    is marginally significant 
it seems like the financial crisis could cause increased regulatory scrutiny which would dissuade 
insurers from possibly incurring additional losses from rebalancing in addition to losses already 
incurred. Therefore, the interaction effect between the post financial crisis and losses establishes 
an incentive to avoid selling non-taxable securities. The main coefficient of interest in model (2) 
is not statistically significant. Therefore, I fail to reject the null hypothesis stated in H2. When it 
is not significant in model 2, the coefficient and significance is very similar to the other models.  
To test H3a and H3b, I observe the coefficient      and      for regression models 
(2, 3 and 4), which rejects the null hypothesis stated in H3a and H3b.
21
 Insurers with two or three 
unusual IRIS ratios are less likely to rebalance toward taxable investments when there is a prior 
year loss. Insurers with four or more unusual IRIS ratios are even less likely to rebalance toward 
taxable investments when there is a prior year loss when compared to H3a. Rebalancing toward 
taxable investments could entail recognizing losses, which insurers may want to avoid because of 
concerns over the level of their reported capital. 
                                                          
21Since, I have a p-value of 0.0574 I can reject the null hypothesis that the variances are equal.    
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 The coefficients      and      are negative and statistically significant. Insurers 
that have lower net admitted assets usually rebalance their tax-free securities toward taxable 
securities.  
-Insert Table 6 here- 
 Overall, the results suggest that insurers with a loss rebalance their tax-free investment 
securities to taxable investment securities prior to the recent financial crisis, but are less likely to 
do so after. Conversely, insurers with four (two) or more (three) unusual IRIS ratios are less 
likely to rebalance towards taxable investments in the current year when a loss occurs in the prior 
year. Collins, Geisler, and Shackelford (1997) presume that an insurer with a large variance of 
unusual IRIS ratios has greater exposure to regulatory pressure especially when gains are 
apparent in the prior year. 
 Therefore, to test if the model holds for insurers with gains, I estimate the following 
regression model: 
                   
                                                                                  
                                                                                 
                                                      
                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
where            is an indicator variable with a value of one if the P&C insurer had a net gain 
from prior year. All other variables are defined in model 1. I find the opposite effect that insurers 
rebalance their tax-free securities toward taxable securities in the year subsequent to reporting a 
gain. I estimate that an insurer with a gain in the prior year will rebalance their taxable securities 
toward tax-free securities in the current year by 10.0 percent. Despite the financial crisis, I find 
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that insurers that had prior year gains were not affected by the crisis. Specifically, insurers with 
prior year gains rebalanced their tax-free securities towards taxable securities by 0.4 percent 
when the insurer was in regulatory violation by Level A and Level B.
22
          
-Insert Table 7 here- 
  
                                                          
22Since, I have a p-value of 0.1314 I can accept the null hypothesis that the variances are equal.    
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7. Sensitivity 
 Table 8 presents the results from estimating equation (1). To see if my hypotheses will 
hold in the future for losses and gains, I observe what persists at              and 
            .  
where, 
  = For all insurers in the property and casualty industry; 
  = For years 2007 to 2011; 
          = Dichotomous variable with a value of one if the P&C insurer 
will have a loss in the future year, zero otherwise; and 
          = Dichotomous variable with a value of one if the P&C insurer 
will have a gain in the future year, zero otherwise. 
 
For the regression models (1-4) in Tables 8 the coefficients      and     , the effect of a 
loss is positive and significant, implying that insurers with a loss in the future and post crisis are 
more likely to rebalance toward taxable investments. The interaction effect between 
             and                is positive and significant. Therefore, the financial crisis 
shows a positive effect when an insurer will have a loss in the future, which suggests that 
insurers could have over/under reserved their losses if they anticipated the financial crisis. The 
coefficient      is negative and significant. The results show that insurers with a loss in the 
future will rebalance their tax-free securities toward taxable securities in the current year after 
the financial crisis by 5.9 percent; however, this rebalancing strategy declines to 1.8 percent 
when the insurer is in regulatory violation.   
-Insert Table 8 here- 
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 On average, for P&C insurers, I predict gains from both their investments and 
underwriting in the future. For the regression models (1-4) in Table 9, the coefficients are similar 
to Table 7. The financial crisis did impact an insurer that incurred gains in the future to rebalance 
away from taxable securities by 2.4 percent from 6.0 percent. It is noteworthy to mention the 
coefficient    is not statistically significant. The financial crisis changes the coefficient results in 
table 8 and 9 for losses (gains) in the future year.  This is shown by the interaction term having 
the same sign and similar significance to the losses (gains) term in table 6 and 7, respectively. 
Therefore, I can interpret that insurers are less likely to rebalance their portfolios of investment 
securities subsequent to the financial crisis and in regulatory violation. This behavior exists 
regardless of when losses (gains) occur, i.e. whether they occur in the prior or future year.  
-Insert Table 9 here- 
 For stock and non-stock P&C insurers, the results are similar to Table 6. However, non-
stock P&C insurers do not rebalance their taxable securities toward tax-free securities when they 
are in regulatory violation. A possible explanation for this could be based on the public scrutiny 
of the P&C insurer. For example, regulators have a specified window of time to finish the 
financial assessment for the insurer. Since non-stock P&C insurers have different regulatory 
requirements, P&C insurers with gains are sometimes over-looked. I find that stock P&C 
insurers with losses subsequent to the financial crisis are more likely to increase their ratio of 
taxable/nontaxable securities by at most 12.5 percent for a panel of approximately 2,800 U.S. 
firms during the period 2007-2011. However, they are less likely to increase their ratio of 
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taxable/nontaxable securities when they are in regulatory violation by (3.2) percent.
23
 Typically, 
non-stock P&C insurer owners are policyholders. With non-stock insurers, excess premiums are 
often returned to the customers at the end of the year.  Alternatively, excess premiums are used 
to adjust future premiums. Most importantly, policyholders have a vote in the insurers 
operations, which includes asset information. Further, non-stock insurers do not receive the same 
market pressure requirements as stock P&C insurers from Wall Street to meet or exceed an 
earnings target. Since non-stock insurers are under less pressure than stock insurers, stock 
insurers have to accommodate multiple entities (e.g., SEC, NAIC, and state regulators). 
Therefore, conducting a sensitivity test should shed further light on the incentives identified in 
my earlier results. 
-Insert Table 10 here- 
 Finally, Table 11 presents the results from estimating equation (1) after removing 2008 
and 2009. The results remain significant and similar except for the level B IRIS ratio variable. 
The coefficient       is negative and statistically significant. I find that insurers with losses 
subsequent to the financial crisis are more likely to increase their ratio of taxable/nontaxable 
securities by at most 8.8 percent for a panel of approximately 2,800 U.S. firms during the period 
2007-2011. However, insurers are more likely to decrease their ratio of taxable/nontaxable 
securities when they are in regulatory violation by 4.7 percent.  
-Insert Table 11 here- 
                                                          
23The main difference between a stock insurance company and a non-stock insurance company is that the stock owned company 
is responsible for making money for the stockholders whereas a non-stock owned company is responsible for making money for 
the policy holders.   
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8. Conclusion and Limitations 
 I examine whether regulatory requirements determine if insurers rebalance their tax-free 
securities toward taxable securities when a loss occurs, especially after a financial crisis. My 
analysis of a large sample of P&C insurers indicates that, on average, insurers with a loss in the 
prior year are more likely to rebalance toward taxable investments in the current year. Thus, 
being in a regulated environment does not cause insurers to make tax inefficient investment 
decisions. However, this incentive declines after the financial crisis. My results suggest that 
increased regulatory scrutiny can decrease the incentive to make tax efficient portfolio decisions. 
Also, on average, insurers with four (two) or more (three) unusual IRIS ratios are less likely to 
rebalance toward taxable investments when a loss occurs in the prior year. Thus, the 
consequences of regulatory violation outweigh the potential future tax savings from portfolio 
rebalancing.  
There are limitations to this study. First, I partitioned the sample based on stock versus 
non-stock insurers. Stock insurers are under the scrutiny of regulators and the judgment of the 
capital market, while non-stock P&C insurers are only under scrutiny from regulators. From a 
regulatory standpoint, this study offers useful information for insurance regulators. I provide 
empirical evidence for mutual insurers with relatively weak IRIS ratios and how insurers decide 
to rebalance their tax-free securities towards taxable securities when a loss occurs, especially 
after a financial crisis. This behavior is not easily noticed by regulators.    
 In light of this current study, future research is warranted in the area. Bratton (1994) and 
Gaver and Paterson (2007) suggest that P&C insurers often “manage” loss reserves to reduce the 
reported number of IRIS ratio violations. Further examining how P&C insurers manage the loss 
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reserve is an interesting extension of this study.
24
 Following Grace and Leverty (2012), a 
possible extension for this study could be that P&C insurers that manage loss reserves to 
decrease the reported number of IRIS ratio violations were more likely to do so after the 
financial crisis, because P&C insurers want to avoid regulatory scrutiny.  
  
                                                          
24For example, Bratton (1994) finds that almost half the insolvent insurers had three or fewer IRIS ratio violations one-year prior. 
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Appendix A 
INSURANCE REGULATORY INFORMATION SYSTEM (IRIS) RATIO DEFINITIONS and 
EXPLANATIONS  
OVERALL RATIOS 
Ratio 1: Gross Premium Written to Policyholders’ Surplus. 
Explanation:  
- Policyholders’ surplus provides a cushion for absorbing above-average losses. The Gross 
Premiums Written to Policyholders’ Surplus ratio measures the adequacy of this cushion, 
without the effects of premiums ceded to reinsurers. The higher the ratio, the more risk the 
company bears in relation to the policyholders’ surplus available to absorb loss variations. 
  
Ratio 2: Net Premium Written to Policyholders’ Surplus.  
Explanation: 
- Same definition as Ratio 1 above (except Net Premiums Written is the variable used).  
Ratio 3: Change in Net Premium Written.  
Explanation: 
- Major increases or decreases in net premiums written indicate a lack of stability in the 
insurers operations. A large increase in premiums may signal abrupt entry into new lines of 
business or sales territories. In addition, such an increase in writings may be a sign that the 
company is attempting to increase cash flow in order to meet loss payments. A large decrease 
in premiums may indicate the discontinuance of certain lines of business, scaled back 
writings due to large losses in certain lines, or loss of market share due to competition.  
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Ratio 4: Surplus Aid to Policyholders’ Surplus.  
Explanation: 
- The use of surplus aid reinsurance treaties may be an indication that company management 
believes policyholders’ surplus to be inadequate. In addition, the continued solvency of 
companies with a large portion of policyholders’ surplus resulting from surplus aid may 
depend upon the continuing cooperation of the reinsurer. 
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PROFITABILITY RATIOS 
Ratio 5: Two-Year Overall Operating.  
Explanation: 
- The overall operating ratio is a measure of the profitability of an insurance company. Over 
the long run, the profitability of the business is a principal determinant of the company's 
financial stability and solvency. 
 
Ratio 6: Investment Yield.  
Explanation: 
- Investment yield is a major component of profitability for an insurer. In addition to 
measuring one important element in profitability, the investment yield also provides an 
indication of the general quality of the company's investment portfolio. 
 
Ratio 7: Change in Policyholders’ Surplus. 
Explanation: 
- The Change in Policyholders’ Surplus is, in a sense, the ultimate measure of the 
improvement or deterioration in the company's financial condition during the year.  
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LIQUIDITY RATIOS 
Ratio 8: Liabilities to Liquid Assets. 
Explanation: 
- The ratio of total liabilities to liquid assets is a measure of the company's ability to meet the 
financial demands that may be placed upon it. It also provides a rough indication of the 
possible implications for policyholders if liquidation becomes necessary. 
 
Ratio 9: Gross Agents’ Balances to Policyholders’ Surplus. 
Explanation: 
- The ratio of agents' balances to policyholders’ surplus measures the degree to which solvency 
of an insurer depends upon an asset that frequently cannot be converted to cash in the event 
of liquidation. In addition, the ratio is reasonably effective in distinguishing troubled from 
sound companies. 
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RESERVES RATIOS 
Ratio 10: One-Year Reserve Development to Policyholders’ Surplus  
Explanation: 
- This ratio measures a company’s one-year loss reserve development per Schedule P as a 
percent of prior years’ policyholders’ surplus. The ratio result indicates the historical 
accuracy of the estimation of loss reserves. 
 
Ratio 11: Two-Year Reserve Development to Policyholders’ Surplus  
Explanation: 
- The two-year reserve development to policyholders’ surplus ratio is the sum of the current 
reserve for losses incurred more than two years prior plus payments on those losses during 
the past two years minus the reserves established for those losses two years earlier. 
 
Ratio 12: Estimated Current Reserve Deficiency to Policyholders’ Surplus 
Explanation:  
- This ratio provides an estimate of the adequacy of current reserves. 
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IRIS Summary 
  Usual Range 
  Minimum Maximum 
Ratio 1 Gross Premium Written to Policyholders’ Surplus 0 900 
Ratio 2 Net Premium Written to Policyholders’ Surplus 0 300 
Ratio 3 Change in Net Premium Written -33 33 
Ratio 4 Surplus Aid to Policyholders’ Surplus 0 15 
Ratio 5 Two-Year Overall Operating Ratio 0 100 
Ratio 6 Investment Yield  5 10 
Ratio 7 Change in Policyholders’ Surplus (10) 50 
Ratio 8 Liabilities to Liquid Assets 0 105 
Ratio 9 Gross Agents’ Balances to Policyholders’ Surplus 0 40 
Ratio 10 One-Year Reserve Development to Policyholders’ 
Surplus 
0 20 
Ratio 11 Two-Year Reserve Development to Policyholders’ 
Surplus 
0 20 
Ratio 12 Estimated Current Reserve Deficiency to 
Policyholders’ Surplus 
0 25 
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GAINS vs. LOSSES 
 
Figure 1. This figure displays the indicator variables averages for gains and losses by year. 
The sample is drawn from 2006-2010 and it includes observations of insurers reporting 
data from the NAIC.    
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   NO WEAK IRIS vs. WEAK IRIS
 
Figure 2. This figure displays the indicator variables averages for insurers with no weak 
IRIS ratio and for insurers with weak IRIS ratios (WEAK B and WEAK A) insurers that 
exceed certain bounds (using IRIS ratios) of 2 or more by year. The sample is drawn from 
2007-2011 and it includes observations of insurers reporting data from the NAIC.    
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WEAK B vs. WEAK A 
 
Figure 3. This figure displays the indicator variables averages for insurers with weak IRIS 
ratio that may require and review from regulators (WEAK B) and for insurers with weak 
IRIS ratios that are a high priority for review (WEAK A) by year. The sample is drawn 
from 2007-2011 and it includes observations of insurers reporting data from the NAIC.   
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NO WEAK IRIS vs. WEAK B vs. WEAK A   
 
Figure 4. This figure displays the indicator variables averages for insurers with no weak 
IRIS ratios, for insurers with weak IRIS ratio that may require a review from regulators 
(WEAK B), and for insurers with weak IRIS ratios that are a high priority for review 
(WEAK A) by year. The sample is drawn from 2007-2011 and it includes observations of 
insurers reporting data from the NAIC.    
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Table 1 
Sample Selection Criteria 
Insurers in the 2007-2011 NAIC property–casualty database      14,275 
Less:  
                   Insurers incorporated outside of the US 
   
(70) 
           Insurers with insufficient data to calculate control variables 
 
(1,175) 
Sample for testing H1, H2,H3a, & H3b: 
   
13,030  
               
This table describes the sample construction procedures. The table begins with National Association of Insurance 
Commission (NAIC) data. The sample includes 14,275 insurer-year observations for 2007-2011. To test H1-H3b, I  
removed 70 insurer-year observations that are incorporated outside the United States and 1,175 insurer-year  
observations that had insufficient data to calculate the control variables I used in this study.  
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Table 2 
Variable Definitions 
    Variable 
  
Definition 
Taxable 
Securities  
= 
Investments that insurers are subject to tax. 
    Non-Taxable 
Securities  
= 
Investments that insurers are not subject to taxes. 
    TAX / 
(TAX+NONTA
XABLE) 
 
= 
The ratio of the Taxable Securities divided by the sum of Taxable 
Securities plus Non-Taxable Securities. 
   
 
NetINCOME 
 
= Defined as the total net income after taxes for insurers.  
   
 
P_NetLOSS 
 
= 
Indicator variable with a value of one if an insurer suffered a loss in the 
prior year and zero otherwise.  
   
 
P_NetGAIN 
 
= 
Indicator variable with a value of one if an insurer had a gain in the prior 
year and zero otherwise.  
    
F_NetLOSS 
 
= 
Indicator variable with a value of one if an insurer will have a loss in the 
future year and zero otherwise.  
 
  
 
F_NetGAIN 
 
= 
Indicator variable with a value of one if an insurer will have a gain in the 
future year and zero otherwise.  
    
POST_CRISIS  
= 
Indicator variable with a value of one if year is 2009, 2010, or 2011, zero 
otherwise. 
   
 
WEAK_IRIS_A 
 
= 
Indicator variable with a value of one if the insurer has four or more 
unusual Insurance Regulatory Information Systems (IRIS) ratios, zero 
otherwise. 
   
 
WEAK_IRIS_B 
 
= 
Indicator variable with a value of one if the insurer has two or three 
unusual Insurance Regulatory Information Systems (IRIS) ratios, zero 
otherwise. 
   
 
IRIS_TOTAL 
 
= 
Ratios are computed using statutory accounting statement data. Unusual 
ratios are those that exceed certain bounds specified by the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). 
   
 
NetADMASSET
S  
= 
Assets that are liquid and whose value can be assessed, or receivables 
that can be expected to be paid. 
   
 
LN_ASSETS 
 
= Logarithm value of net admitted assets. 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
Variable Definitions 
   
 
Direct Premium 
Written  
= 
Defined as the direct premium written for insurers. 
   
 
DirPREMWRIT
TEN  
= 
Direct premium written by an insurer scaled by net admitted assets. 
   
 
Net 
Underwriting 
Gains (Losses) 
 
= 
Defined as the net underwriting gains (losses) for insurers. 
   
 
NetUNDERGAI
N  
= 
Net underwriting gains (losses) scaled by net admitted assets. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics for the sample of 13,030 insurer-year observations 
Property & Casualty Variables Mean Standard Dev. Median Minimum Maximum 
      
Taxable Securities (in 000's) $17,777.71      120,457.20  $1,062.46 ($3,155.78) $5,460,621.00 
Non-Taxable Securities (in 000's) $5,686.73        35,023.66  $85.10 ($446.50) $996,727.50 
           Independent and Control Variables for H1, H2, H3a, & H3b 
       NetADMASSETS (in 000's) $623,348.60    3,626,100.00  $53,838.48 $127.18 $115,000,000.00 
NetINCOME (in 000's) $14,025.50      155,603.40  $750.23 ($4,815,623.00) $6,079,272.00 
Direct Premium Written (in 000's) $184,902.00      840,845.90  $24,899.33 ($18,257.02) $30,400,000.00 
Net Underwriting Gains (Losses)  (in 000's) ($3,082.73)     113,361.80  $0.00 ($4,743,695.00) $2,369,631.00 
IRIS_TOTAL 1.81 1.32 1.00 0.00 11.00 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables used in Analyses 
          
 
count 
 
mean 
 
min 
 
p50 
 
max 
TAX / (TAX+NONTAXABLE)   13,030   0.796  -2.416  0.921  3.234 
P_NetLOSS   13,042  
 
0.200 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
1.000 
P_NetGAIN   13,042  
 
0.793 
 
0.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
POST_CRISIS   13,042  
 
0.610 
 
0.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
WEAK_IRIS_A   13,042  
 
0.095 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
1.000 
WEAK_IRIS_B   13,042  
 
0.367 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
1.000 
LN_ASSETS   13,042  
 
11.044 
 
4.846 
 
10.894 
 
18.564 
DirPREMWRITTEN   13,042  
 
0.973 
 
-0.060 
 
0.413 
 
65.439 
NetUNDERGAIN   13,042  
 
-0.008 
 
-12.204 
 
0.000 
 
1.555 
          Observations   13,030                  
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Table 5 
Correlation Table 
 
TAX / 
(TAX+ 
NON 
TAXABLE) NetLOSS NetGAIN 
POST_CR
ISIS 
WEAK_IR
IS_A 
WEAK_IR
IS_B 
LN_ASSE
TS 
DirPREM
WRITTEN 
NetUNDE
RGAIN 
TAX / 
(TAX+NONTAXA
BLE) 1.0000 
        
          P_NetLOSS 0.1664 1.0000 
       
 
(0.0000) 
        P_NetGAIN -0.1738 -0.9814 1.0000 
      
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
       POST_CRISIS -0.0420 0.1436 -0.1416 1.0000 
     
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
      WEAK_IRIS_A 0.1293 0.2845 -0.2991 0.0236 1.0000 
    
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0070) 
     WEAK_IRIS_B 0.0686 0.1975 -0.1981 0.0227 -0.2468 1.0000 
   
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0096) (0.0000) 
    LN_ASSETS -0.3447 -0.1288 0.1374 -0.0014 -0.0553 -0.0602 1.0000 
  
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8747) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   DirPREM 
WRITTEN -0.0496 -0.0136 -0.0031 -0.024 0.0439 0.0033 -0.0967 1.0000 
 
 
(0.0000) (0.1205) (0.7241) (0.0060) (0.0000) (0.7054) (0.0000) 
  NetUNDERGAIN -0.0723 -0.3141 0.3141 -0.1400 -0.2708 -0.1792 0.0840 0.0184 1.0000 
 
(0.0074) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0358) 
                   
* p-value are in parentheses 
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Table 6 
Results of Estimation of the Effects of Prior Year Losses, Post Crisis, and Regulatory 
Violation on Taxable Securities divided by the sum of Taxable Securities plus Non-Taxable 
Securities 
 
  
 
TAX / (TAX+NONTAXABLE) 
 
Pred
. 
Sign 
 
Model 
(1) 
 
Model 
(2) 
 
Model 
(3) 
 
Model 
(4) 
  
 
b/t 
 
b/t 
 
b/t 
 
b/t 
Intercept   
 
1.116*** 
 
1.110*** 
 
1.110*** 
 
1.010*** 
  
 
(46.87) 
 
(46.47) 
 
(45.98) 
 
(45.16) 
P_NetLOSS + 
 
0.085*** 
 
0.082*** 
 
0.103*** 
 
0.099*** 
  
 
(10.12) 
 
(9.31) 
 
(9.78) 
 
(8.23) 
POST_CRISIS - 
 
-
0.033*** 
 
-
0.033*** 
 
-
0.033*** 
 
-
0.033*** 
  
 
(-9.63) 
 
(-9.63) 
 
(-9.51) 
 
(-9.48) 
P_NetLOSS X POST_CRISIS - 
 
-0.017* 
 
-0.015 
 
-0.016* 
 
-0.016* 
  
 
(-1.80) 
 
(-1.60) 
 
(-1.74) 
 
(-1.65) 
WEAK_IRIS_A + 
 
  
0.080*** 
   
0.091*** 
  
 
  
(6.48) 
   
(6.48) 
P_NetLOSS X WEAK_IRIS_A - 
 
  
-
0.053*** 
   
-
0.070*** 
  
 
  
(-3.36) 
   
(-3.90) 
WEAK_IRIS_B + 
 
    
0.023*** 
 
0.031*** 
  
 
    
(3.19) 
 
(4.05) 
P_NetLOSS X WEAK_IRIS_B - 
 
    
-
0.043*** 
 
-
0.039*** 
  
 
    
(-3.60) 
 
(-2.96) 
LN_ASSETS - 
 
-
0.028*** 
 
-
0.027*** 
 
-
0.028*** 
 
-
0.027*** 
  
 
(-13.00) 
 
(-12.92) 
 
(-13.05) 
 
(-12.90) 
DirPREMWRITTEN - 
 
-
0.009*** 
 
-
0.010*** 
 
-
0.010*** 
 
-
0.010*** 
  
 
(-4.01) 
 
(-4.05) 
 
(-4.24) 
 
(-4.35) 
NetUNDERGAIN + 
 
-0.005 
 
0.013 
 
-0.002 
 
0.017 
  
 
(-0.36) 
 
(0.69) 
 
(-0.12) 
 
(0.80) 
Company Indicators 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
F 
 
 
92.67 
 
70.77 
 
70.32 
 
57.58 
R-square 
 
 
0.0716 
 
0.0757 
 
0.0732 
 
0.0780 
Number of Observations 
 
 
13030 
 
13030 
 
13030 
 
13030 
  
 
       * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** 
p<0.01                   
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Table 7 
Results of Estimation of the Effects of Prior Year Gains, Post Crisis, and Regulatory 
Violation on Taxable Securities divided by the sum of Taxable Securities plus Non-
Taxable Securities 
 
  
 
TAX / (TAX+NONTAXABLE) 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
 
Model (1) 
 
Model (2) 
 
Model (3) 
 
Model (4) 
   
b/t 
 
b/t 
 
b/t 
 
b/t 
Intercept   
 
1.200*** 
 
1.191*** 
 
1.214*** 
 
1.198*** 
   
(53.39) 
 
(52.34) 
 
(52.05) 
 
(48.51) 
P_NetGAIN - 
 
-0.087*** 
 
-0.082*** 
 
-0.106*** 
 
-0.100*** 
   
(-10.27) 
 
(-9.27) 
 
(-10.15) 
 
(-8.38) 
POST_CRISIS - 
 
-0.050*** 
 
-0.048*** 
 
-0.049*** 
 
-0.048*** 
   
(-6.26) 
 
(-5.97) 
 
(-6.14) 
 
(-5.97) 
P_NetGAIN X 
POST_CRISIS + 
 
0.017* 
 
0.015 
 
0.016* 
 
0.015 
   
(1.82) 
 
(1.58) 
 
(1.74) 
 
(1.64) 
WEAK_IRIS_A + 
   
0.029** 
   
0.022 
     
(2.34) 
   
(1.51) 
P_NetGAIN X 
WEAK_IRIS_A + 
   
0.047*** 
   
0.064*** 
     
(2.99) 
   
(3.60) 
WEAK_IRIS_B + 
     
-0.022** 
 
-0.009 
       
(-2.21) 
 
(-0.78) 
P_NetGAIN X 
WEAK_IRIS_B + 
     
0.046*** 
 
0.040*** 
       
(3.85) 
 
(2.96) 
LN_ASSETS - 
 
-0.027*** 
 
-0.027*** 
 
-0.028*** 
 
-0.027*** 
   
(-12.92) 
 
(-12.85) 
 
(-12.98) 
 
(-12.84) 
DirPREMWRITTEN - 
 
-0.009*** 
 
-0.009*** 
 
-0.010*** 
 
-0.010*** 
   
(-4.08) 
 
(-4.10) 
 
(-4.31) 
 
(-4.38) 
NetUNDERGAIN + 
 
-0.004 
 
0.013 
 
-0.001 
 
0.017 
   
(-0.31) 
 
(0.68) 
 
(-0.07) 
 
(0.79) 
Company Indicators 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
F 
  
91.82 
 
69.77 
 
70.09 
 
57.18 
R-square 
  
0.0724 
 
0.076 
 
0.0742 
 
0.0783 
Number of Observations 
  
13030 
 
13030 
 
13030 
 
13030 
          * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01                 
  
  51 
 
 
Table 8 
Results of Estimation of the Effects of Future Year Losses, Post Crisis, and Regulatory 
Violation on Taxable Securities divided by the sum of Taxable Securities plus Non-Taxable 
Securities 
 
  
 
TAX / (TAX+NONTAXABLE) 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
 
Model (1) 
 
Model (2) 
 
Model (3) 
 
Model (4) 
   
b/t 
 
b/t 
 
b/t 
 
b/t 
Intercept   
 
1.142*** 
 
1.133*** 
 
1.135*** 
 
1.121*** 
   
(46.80) 
 
(46.01) 
 
(45.46) 
 
(44.07) 
F_NetLOSS + 
 
0.045*** 
 
0.045*** 
 
0.046*** 
 
0.040*** 
   
(5.42) 
 
(5.29) 
 
(4.72) 
 
(3.81) 
POST_CRISIS - 
 
-0.036*** 
 
-0.036*** 
 
-0.036*** 
 
-0.036*** 
   
(-9.61) 
 
(-9.58) 
 
(-9.62) 
 
(-9.59) 
F_NetLOSS X 
POST_CRISIS + 
 
0.020** 
 
0.020** 
 
0.020** 
 
0.019** 
   
(2.11) 
 
(2.11) 
 
(2.08) 
 
(2.01) 
WEAK_IRIS_A + 
   
0.083*** 
   
0.094*** 
     
(6.17) 
   
(6.49) 
F_NetLOSS X 
WEAK_IRIS_A - 
   
-0.047*** 
   
-0.041*** 
     
(-2.56) 
   
(-2.06) 
WEAK_IRIS_B + 
     
0.018** 
 
0.027*** 
       
(2.17) 
 
(3.09) 
F_NetLOSS X 
WEAK_IRIS_B - 
     
-0.008 
 
-0.000 
       
(-0.67) 
 
(0.03) 
LN_ASSETS - 
 
-0.030*** 
 
-0.030*** 
 
-0.030*** 
 
-0.029*** 
   
(-13.80) 
 
(-13.61) 
 
(-13.72) 
 
(-13.42) 
DirPREMWRITTEN - 
 
-0.009*** 
 
-0.009*** 
 
-0.010*** 
 
-0.010*** 
   
(-4.14) 
 
(-4.17) 
 
(-4.31) 
 
(-4.42) 
NetUNDERGAIN + 
 
-0.002 
 
0.030 
 
-0.000 
 
0.041 
   
(-0.09) 
 
(1.04) 
 
(-0.00) 
 
(1.23) 
Company Indicators 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
F 
  
77.30 
 
62.91 
 
59.09 
 
51.40 
R-square 
  
0.0756 
 
0.0805 
 
0.0765 
 
0.0828 
Number of Observations 
  
10335 
 
10335 
 
10335 
 
10335 
          * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01                 
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Table 9 
Results of Estimation of the Effects of Future Year Gains, Post Crisis, and Regulatory 
Violation on Taxable Securities divided by the sum of Taxable Securities plus Non-Taxable 
Securities 
 
  
 
TAX / (TAX+NONTAXABLE) 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
 
Model (1) 
 
Model (2) 
 
Model (3) 
 
Model (4) 
   
b/t 
 
b/t 
 
b/t 
 
b/t 
Intercept   
 
1.190*** 
 
1.178*** 
 
1.182*** 
 
1.160*** 
   
(50.81) 
 
(49.76) 
 
(50.03) 
 
(47.46) 
F_NetGAIN - 
 
-0.047*** 
 
-0.046*** 
 
-0.049*** 
 
-0.041*** 
   
(-5.69) 
 
(-5.41) 
 
(-5.06) 
 
(-3.91) 
POST_CRISIS - 
 
-0.016** 
 
-0.016** 
 
-0.016** 
 
-0.017** 
   
(-2.16) 
 
(-2.14) 
 
(-2.20) 
 
(-2.29) 
F_NetGAIN X 
POST_CRISIS - 
 
-0.020** 
 
-0.020** 
 
-0.020** 
 
-0.019** 
   
(-2.07) 
 
(-2.10) 
 
(-2.05) 
 
(-2.00) 
WEAK_IRIS_A + 
   
0.038*** 
   
0.055*** 
     
(2.78) 
   
(3.56) 
F_NetGAIN X 
WEAK_IRIS_A + 
   
0.042** 
   
0.036* 
     
(2.31) 
   
(1.82) 
WEAK_IRIS_B + 
     
0.008 
 
0.027*** 
       
(0.95) 
 
(2.79) 
F_NetGAIN X 
WEAK_IRIS_B + 
     
0.010 
 
-0.000 
       
(0.86) 
 
(-0.03) 
LN_ASSETS - 
 
-0.030*** 
 
-0.030*** 
 
-0.030*** 
 
-0.029*** 
   
(-13.74) 
 
(-13.57) 
 
(-13.67) 
 
(-13.38) 
DirPREMWRITTEN - 
 
-0.010*** 
 
-0.010*** 
 
-0.010*** 
 
-0.010*** 
   
(-4.20) 
 
(-4.20) 
 
(-4.37) 
 
(-4.44) 
NetUNDERGAIN + 
 
-0.000 
 
0.031 
 
-0.001 
 
0.042 
   
(-0.02) 
 
(1.06) 
 
(-0.06) 
 
(1.23) 
Company Indicators 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
F 
  
77.80 
 
62.84 
 
59.57 
 
51.37 
R-square 
  
0.0763 
 
0.0808 
 
0.0772 
 
0.0831 
Number of Observations 
  
10335 
 
10335 
 
10335 
 
10335 
          * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01                 
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Table 10 
Results of Estimation of the Effects of Prior Year Losses, Post Crisis, and Regulatory 
Violation on Taxable Securities divided by the sum of Taxable Securities plus Non-Taxable 
Securities (Stock vs. Non-Stock) 
 
  
 
      
 
Pred. 
Sign 
 
Model (1) 
 
Model (2) 
   
b/t 
 
b/t 
Intercept   
 
1.034*** 
 
1.138*** 
   
(30.76) 
 
(35.83) 
P_NetLOSS + 
 
0.125*** 
 
0.044** 
   
(8.08) 
 
(2.41) 
POST_CRISIS - 
 
-0.036*** 
 
-0.019*** 
   
(-8.55) 
 
(-3.42) 
P_NetLOSS X POST_CRISIS - 
 
-0.021* 
 
-0.014 
   
(-1.71) 
 
(-1.05) 
WEAK_IRIS_A + 
 
0.078*** 
 
0.091*** 
   
(4.50) 
 
(5.09) 
P_NetLOSS X WEAK_IRIS_A - 
 
-0.069*** 
 
-0.037 
   
(-2.93) 
 
(-1.47) 
WEAK_IRIS_B + 
 
0.032*** 
 
0.040** 
   
(3.49) 
 
(2.91) 
P_NetLOSS X WEAK_IRIS_B - 
 
-0.057*** 
 
-0.010 
   
(-3.46) 
 
(-0.47) 
LN_ASSETS - 
 
-0.023*** 
 
-0.027*** 
   
(-8.08) 
 
(-9.40) 
DirPREMWRITTEN - 
 
-0.010*** 
 
-0.006 
   
(-4.21) 
 
(-1.26) 
NetUNDERGAIN + 
 
-0.004 
 
0.113* 
   
(-0.28) 
 
(1.79) 
Company Indicators 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
F 
  
35.66 
 
23.79 
R-square 
  
0.0591 
 
0.1081 
Number of Observations 
  
9310 
 
3720 
      * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01         
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Table 11 
Results of Estimation of the Effects of Prior Year Losses, Post Crisis, and Regulatory 
Violation on Taxable Securities divided by the sum of Taxable Securities plus Non-Taxable 
Securities (2008 & 2009 Removed) 
 
  
 
TAX / (TAX+NONTAXABLE) 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
 
Model (1) 
 
Model (2) 
 
Model (3) 
 
Model (4) 
   
b/t 
 
b/t 
 
b/t 
 
b/t 
Intercept   
 
1.090*** 
 
1.085*** 
 
1.085*** 
 
1.075*** 
   
(46.61) 
 
(46.20) 
 
(45.71) 
 
(45.00) 
P_NetLOSS + 
 
0.097*** 
 
0.091*** 
 
0.112*** 
 
0.088*** 
   
(10.01) 
 
(8.75) 
 
(9.28) 
 
(5.30) 
POST_CRISIS - 
 
-0.042*** 
 
-0.043*** 
 
-0.043*** 
 
-0.044*** 
   
(-10.14) 
 
(-10.21) 
 
(-10.28) 
 
(-10.43) 
P_NetLOSS X 
POST_CRISIS - 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.012 
 
-0.013 
   
(-1.19) 
 
(-1.12) 
 
(-0.99) 
 
(-1.13) 
WEAK_IRIS_A + 
   
0.083*** 
   
0.092*** 
     
(6.02) 
   
(6.44) 
P_NetLOSS X 
WEAK_IRIS_A - 
   
-0.044** 
   
-0.041* 
     
(-2.33) 
   
(-1.77) 
WEAK_IRIS_B + 
     
0.021** 
 
0.029*** 
       
(2.60) 
 
(3.41) 
P_NetLOSS X 
WEAK_IRIS_B - 
     
-0.039** 
 
-0.013 
       
(-2.70) 
 
(-0.72) 
LN_ASSETS - 
 
-0.024*** 
 
-0.024*** 
 
-0.024*** 
 
-0.024*** 
   
(-11.70) 
 
(-11.61) 
 
(-11.67) 
 
(-11.53) 
DirPREMWRITTEN - 
 
-0.009*** 
 
-0.009*** 
 
-0.009*** 
 
-0.010*** 
   
(-4.09) 
 
(-4.13) 
 
(-4.32) 
 
(-4.41) 
NetUNDERGAIN + 
 
-0.007 
 
0.010 
 
-0.004 
 
0.015 
   
(-0.63) 
 
(0.62) 
 
(-0.34) 
 
(0.74) 
Company Indicators 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
F 
  
88.62 
 
69.02 
 
67.38 
 
56.01 
R-square 
  
0.0704 
 
0.0752 
 
0.0718 
 
0.0773 
Number of Observations 
  
7843 
 
7843 
 
7843 
 
7843 
          * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01                 
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